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This post is for Kike, my faithful university class mate

[Today] the challenges that so many companies are making are more than a response to “globalization”. They denote nothing less than the obsolence of the corporate model many of us have grown up with. For some pople it won’t be easy to let go of old concepts, old hierarchies, old sources of power-but it’s mandatory to think anew.

-Vernon R. Loucks, Jr. Chairman and CEO

Baxter International, in Review, 1990.

Taylorism and Professional Education.

“Objective observers are becoming increasingly aware of the need to consider the manufacturing process as a whole rather than as an object for piecewise suboptimizaition. This holistic, or system viewpoint must include manufacturer’s relations with subcontractors and suppliers as well as customers… If manufacturing engineers and manufacturing operations managers are to contribute effectively to the redesign of the workplace, it seems obvious that their professional training must include a recognition of the new integrated manufacturing system reality and how to deal with it effectively…

The American manufacturing environment is now in a rapid state of change. Yet, our business schools and engineering schools have not yet begun to provide the leadership that this restructuring of the American manufacturing environment demands. Some observers believe that American manufacturing managers have been late coming to the party, that they have been slow to recognize the advantages of Japanese and, to a lesser degree, European developments… As I see the situation, American business leaders are now well in advance of engineering and business schools in recognizing and practicing total quality principles, participative management, worker empowerment, and the like. If this perception is correct, why is it so? My answer will be that American professional school faculties have not abandoned Taylorism.”

Taylorism

Frederick Winston Taylor is high in the pantheon of American engineering heroes (Copley, 1923). In his obsessive optimization of individual rigid separation of thinking from doing, Taylor is the paradigmatic manufacturing engineer. Taylor is important, not merely because he made revolutionary contributions to the manufacturing canon, but also because the general style he set became the universal paradigm for American engineering practice and for engineering education, and remains so even today.

I intend in this paper to focus on how the elements of Taylorism are applied in the workplace and in the engineering classroom and why this environment is no longer right for modern America. I hold that Taylorism continues to be a major obstacle in our path to manufacturing efficiency and that it must be replaced as the central element of our engineering educational philosophy as well.”

The essential elements of Taylorism

“What are the essential elements of “Tayloristic” engineering practice that currently inhibit technical progress? I suggest that the following seven are critical:

  1. Analytic bottom-up approach, where analytic here is used in the classical sense of “breaking into components parts or elements.”
  2. The absence of goal-definition phase in normal engineering design practice.
  3. Engineering practice in a vacuum, without regard to human factors.
  4. The hierarchical, nonprofessional style of current American engineering practice.
  5. The fantasy of “value-free design”.
  6. The traditional Taylor practice of separating thinking from doing
  7. Strong emphasis on individual reward for individual effort.

Analogous to Taylor’s procedure of breaking down the manufacturing process into elemental steps, the first step in the engineering design process is the careful division of the overall task into simple sub elements and assigning these parts to individuals or teams for detailed design. This is so simple and obvious, and it works so well in certain practical design tasks and in engineering design education, that we may fail to understand the deeper implications of this step.

But these are only a few of the more obvious implications of the analytic “bottom-up” Tayloristic approach to engineering. One other implication may be somewhat less obvious. The classically trained engineering “bottom-upper” accepts the goals of a project as given. Such engineering goals are embodied in the “specification sheet”. How could it be otherwise? The classically trained engineer may ask. How can one design or manufacture something without a specification sheet or a blueprint? This question may be perfectly logical when applied to a conventional, well understood object but irrational when we face the unknown. By insisting on a well developed and complete set of specifications before one can begin the design and production of a new and untried object, the engineer removes himself from the most exciting, creative step; helping to set the specifications in the first place. But this is exactly the way we currently tech engineers to think and to design.

In engineering education, the Tayloristic approach seems so obvious that it is universal. We begin with the simplest mechanisms and equations, then proceed step-by-step to more complex devices and mathematics, in a bottom-up manner. Thus, the budding engineer is taught without words to accept engineering reality as susceptible to decomposition into simpler sub-units best handled in isolation, a hierarchical management approach with professors as “bosses” who “think” and students as “workers” who “do,” and an absence of discussion of goals, except for questions that are meant to elicit what the boss wants.

If engineering educators inculcate reverence for inviolate specifications, as we continue to do, we are also implying that goals are external to the design process and are to be set by someone else. This absence of the goal-definition phase is the second major distinguishing feature of conventional Tayloristic engineering practice that is crippling our national attempt to regain manufacturing leadership in world markets.

The third crippling attribute is the engineering practice in a mechanistic vacuum, without regard to human factors. Human factors must enter into the design, production, use, and especially product retirement. Yet, none of these essential steps is considered currently in engineering education. Humans will use the objects we design and build, but we engineers easily divorce ourselves from responsibility to these human users if we can.

A fourth debilitating attribute of current American engineering practice is its hierarchical, nonprofessional attitude. Conventionally trained engineers accept that they do not have a say in setting specifications for the design object, or in how the product may be manufactured, or in providing graceful retirement from service. They accept that they are not professionals with an overarching professional responsibility to society for their work. They accept the fact that they are employees and thus should be told what to do. And we engineering educators seem to agree. For the mots part, we are not registered professional engineers, and we do not encourage our students to look upon themselves as professionals in training, with professional registration as the confirmation of professional status.

The fifth element in current American engineering practice that gives me concern may grow out of the dehumanizing attitude mentioned as number three above. It is the fantasy that engineers are engaged in value-free design. This can lead to the belief that designers and builders have no responsibility for the use to which our products are put.

One of the primary features of Taylorism is insistence on a rigid separation of thinking from doing. Taylor prohibited participation by production workers in the organization, planning and direction of the manufacturing process. Taylor required his workers to do exactly as they were told to do and no more. This authoritarian stance is carried over into engineering education through its rigid exclusion of students from participation in the planning, organization, and direction of the education process. We all learn by example, and this is one of those debilitating attitudes engineers learn without being conscious of it.

Individual reward for individual effort in the marketplace implies an emphasis on piecework, separate post production quality inspection, and a resistance to the team concept. For example, auto factory line foremen long waged war on any sort of worker interaction on the line. Even talking was forbidden in the early days, and this clash with the traditional American value of mutual support no doubt hastened unionization. IN engineering education, this attribute causes us currently to focus excessively on individual student performance and active discouragement of student team formation. As a result engineering graduates have little or no experience in team building or cooperative effort. Thus, when they do run into the need for team effort, many engineers exhibit resistance, discomfort, and clumsiness at interpersonal professional relationships. Engineers feel the “need” to know who is the boss and for a strong management structure. The “leaderless group” leaves them distinctly uncomfortable (Gibson, 1981). Engineering faculty members often carry this individualism even further. I have been present at a number of faculty promotion and tenure committee meetings at which it was seriously proposed to discount publications according to the number of authors on the paper. Under this concept a two author paper would find each author awarded half a publication, and so on. Unconscious Taylorism in engineer is, I believe, responsible for the sabotage of many participative management programs”

This text has been extracted from John E. Gibson (1992) Manufacturing Systems; foundations of world-class practice. Pp 149-157.  National Academy Press; Washinton, 1992.

 
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Posted by on February 25, 2010 in efficiency, Management, Manufacturing

 

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Did Quality Programs kill GM?

Are Quality Methodologies All Smoke and Mirrors? Part One

Can we blame quality programs for GM’s demise?

World War III has begun. This time it’s not a war of battleships, bullets and bombs—this is an economic war. The weapons are televisions, steel, cars, and clothes. This is a war where we have no allies. Every nation is out to capture more of its share of the U.S. and world’s market. We are being attacked with tires from Brazil, cars from Japan, radios from Taiwan, clothes from China, cosmetics from France, shoes from Italy, and beef from Argentina and Australia.

Businesses in the United States entered the 1980s with a deep-seated resolution to stop the flood of import products and as a result, a group of “new admirals and generals” took over to reestablish our industrial leadership. These were people such as John Akers of IBM, F. James McDonald of General Motors Corp. (GM), Jim Olson of AT&T, and John Young of Hewlett-Packard. Industrial leaders like these laid out strategies to thrust the United States back to the prominence it once had. But it takes years to reestablish a reputation once it has been destroyed or at least tarnished.

General Motors—one of the most powerful and respected organizations—is now in bankruptcy. Why did this happen? What did they try to do that didn’t work? To help understand this, I will report on an interview I had in 1988 with GM’s corporate president, F. James McDonald, which was documented in my book, The Quality/Profit Connection (American Society for Quality Control, 1989).

General Motors celebrated its 100th anniversary on September 16, 2008. It was on this date in 1909 that William C. Durant founded. General Motors Co, predecessor of the current GM. The first motor company acquired by Durant was the Buick Motor Co.

In 1988, GM had 151 facilities operating throughout the United States, in 26 states and 90 cities; in Canada, there were 13 GM plants. It had assembly, manufacturing, distribution, sales, or warehousing operations in 37 other countries. GM also had equity interest in associated companies, which conducted assembly, manufacturing, or distribution in several countries. The average worldwide employment totaled approximately 748,000 men and women in 1984.

Following is an excerpt from my interview with F. James McDonald, president of GM from 1981 to 1987.

H. James Harrington: What were the circumstances leading to the current focus of GM on quality improvement?

F. James McDonald: Efficient, small, high-quality vehicles from Japan, and the availability of these vehicles at just the right time in history were watershed events in the U.S. auto industry. Their perceived quality became the benchmark for all cars—in effect, customer standards changed dramatically. And that change swept through the entire line of products.

HJH: Do you have an official quality policy?

McDonald: Actually, the new quality consciousness at GM began with the development of a quality ethic for all GM units and operations. The essence of this ethic boils down to this: Quality is the number one operating priority at GM today.

HJH: To what sections of the business is it being applied?

McDonald: Quality improvement is being applied to all areas of our business. Specific quality objectives and strategies must be included within each unit’s five-year business plan. All departments within a business, and of course, each employee, contribute to meeting those quality objectives.

On new product programs, resources are allocated very early when our ability to influence the outcome is greatest. This includes the front-loading of people from all disciplines including marketing, product engineering, manufacturing, assembly, quality assurance, financial, and materials management. This includes early sourcing decisions so our suppliers can work with product development teams on potential problems and improvement.

HJH: What activities were undertaken to start the quality improvement process and when did it start?

McDonald: At GM today, we have this kind of strategic vision, and that vision is simply to offer world-class quality in every market segment. By world-class, we mean parity with, or superiority to, the best in the field—product for product.

To assist the operating units in this effort, the corporation has issued four key success factors for quality, which help focus the GM quality ethic and its six mandates. Research has shown that these key success factors must be addressed in business planning and implementation strategies if meaningful quality improvement is to occur.

Let’s take a look at what the key success factors and the associated objectives are.

  • Management commitment. Managers at all levels must be committed to continuous quality improvement and demonstrate their commitment by word or action.
  • People development process. Every employee, regardless of function or level, must have the encouragement, support, and opportunity to be a contributing member of the quality improvement effort.
  • Quality performance processes. Each task and activity must have processes and tools to ensure conformance to specifications and to provide for continuous quality improvement.
  • Customer satisfaction. General Motors must be the world leader in quality, reliability, durability, performance, service, and value, as confirmed by customer-defined measures and marketplace response.

We have also identified the major steps to carry out improvements on any given project and have found that they work quite well.

HJH: What is the role of top management in the improvement process?
McDonald: Achieving true quality maturity is totally the responsibility of top management in our company. Others may carry it out to one degree or another, but those at the top must be willing to go the whole route.

We believe that the whole top management team must be aboard. Even the most inspiring leader can’t hope to reach the organization without total commitment from everyone at the top.

HJH:
What is the role of the employees and the union in the improvement process?

McDonald:
We are absolutely convinced that eventual success depends heavily on the employees. As we discussed, one of our key success factors for quality improvement concerns people-development processes.

For instance, we’ve trained more than 30,000 GM workers in statistical process control techniques. And I must say, to see these tools put to work right on the line is one of the most rewarding experiences I’ve had at GM. So, I think we’re on the right track on the employee side—even though we still have a ways to go.

HJH:What problems did you have in implementing the improvement process?
McDonald: Prevention within manufacturing can take you only so far along the journey. Greater success must come from moving the focus upstream, to design and engineering, for example, by combining the talents of design engineering, processing, and manufacturing, and having them work together as a team instead of individually. That’s the place to start if you’re serious about doing everything right the first time. Our product development teams on new products that we have previously mentioned are addressing this in a fine manner. We are also initiating this concept in our daily operations.

General Motor’s reorganization of its North American passenger cars and its worldwide truck and bus operations addressed changes necessary to ensure quality improvement, accountability for results, and effective allocation of resources. The reorganization was quality-driven from the beginning.

On reviewing McDonald’s comments, I see he was saying all the right things and doing all the right things, but the results have been disastrous for GM investors, employees, suppliers, and the United States.

H. James Harrington; Quality Digest; Are Quality Methodologies All Smoke and Mirrors? Part One

 
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Posted by on August 4, 2009 in Total Quality Management

 

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This is a good ignition. The Scuderi Engine and the split-cycle

The Scuderi Engine cleared another major development hurdle last week after engineers successfully fired the engine for the first time, achieving the split-cycle engine’s revolutionary concept of firing after top dead center.

split-cycle scuderi engine

split-cycle scuderi engine

(To listen to a podcast about the Scuderi Engine running on gasoline, click here or visit www.ScuderiEngine.com).

Engineers at the independent laboratory building the engine will continue further testing and adjustments for the next several weeks in order to fine tune the engine so it can reach its maximum efficiency levels. Engine maps, test data and other performance measurements are being made available to the global automotive community under non-disclosure agreements.

The one-liter, naturally aspirated gasoline prototype potentially produces up to 80 percent fewer toxins than a typical internal combustion engine. When fully developed with its turbocharged and Air-Hybrid components, the engine is expected to achieve significant gains in fuel efficiency – the most since the inception of the Otto cycle over 130 years ago. The original Scuderi Engine was designed and invented by Carmelo Scuderi (1925-2002).

Scuderi split-cycle technology is significant because it gives automotive OEMs an immediate solution for complying with higher emissions and efficiency standards going into effect around the world – without having to make large investments to modify current production processes. The Scuderi Group expects further advancement of the technology once the greater engineering community begins working with the engine, making their own modifications that will most likely take the efficiency to even higher levels.

“This marks another great moment for the engine and our world-class team working on its development,” said Sal Scuderi, president of the Scuderi Group. “It’s great to be able to share this milestone with those who have been following our development and who have showed overwhelming interest since we first introduced this concept and design over three years ago. Now that we have reached this point, we strongly encourage automakers to take advantage of the opportunity that the Scuderi Engine presents to produce more fuel-efficient engines.”

The Scuderi Engine is a split-cycle design that divides the four strokes of a conventional combustion cycle over two paired cylinders: one intake/compression cylinder and one power/exhaust cylinder. By firing after top-dead center, it produces highly efficient, cleaner combustion with one cylinder and compressed air in the other. Unlike conventional engines that require two crankshaft revolutions to complete a single combustion cycle, the Scuderi Engine requires just one. Besides the improvements in efficiency and emissions, studies show that the Scuderi Engine is capable of producing more torque than conventional gasoline and diesel engines.

With the naturally aspirated engine up and running, the Scuderi Group and its independent laboratory continue to work on the next prototypes. Completion of the turbocharged Scuderi Engine and the Scuderi Air-Hybrid are expected in 2010.

About The Scuderi Group Based in West Springfield, Mass., USA, with offices in Frankfurt, Germany, the Scuderi Group is a research and development company focused on proliferating its technology through R&D and licensing. Its revolutionary Scuderi Engine technology, when fully developed, is expected to be the most significant improvement in engine efficiency in over 130 years. The Scuderi Group’s global patent portfolio contains more than 200 patents including 72 issued in more than 50 countries. For more information call 1-413-439-0343 or visit www.ScuderiEngine.com.

View a previous post about the Scuderi engine

 
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Posted by on July 17, 2009 in Mechatronic Applications

 

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Because lots of you are looking for a new engine to power your expectations. The Scuderi Engine

The Scuderi Engine cleared another major development hurdle last week after engineers successfully fired the engine for the first time, achieving the split-cycle engine’s revolutionary concept of firing after top dead center.

(To listen to a podcast about the Scuderi Engine running on gasoline, visit www.ScuderiEngine.com)

Engineers at the independent laboratory building the engine will continue further testing and adjustments for the next several weeks in order to fine tune the engine so it can reach its maximum efficiency levels. Engine maps, test data and other performance measurements are being made available to the global automotive community under non-disclosure agreements.

The one-liter, naturally aspirated gasoline prototype potentially produces up to 80 percent fewer toxins than a typical internal combustion engine. When fully developed with its turbocharged and Air-Hybrid components, the engine is expected to achieve significant gains in fuel efficiency — the most since the inception of the Otto cycle over 130 years ago. The original Scuderi Engine was designed and invented by Carmelo Scuderi (1925-2002).

Scuderi split-cycle technology is significant because it gives automotive OEMs an immediate solution for complying with higher emissions and efficiency standards going into effect around the world — without having to make large investments to modify current production processes. The Scuderi Group expects further advancement of the technology once the greater engineering community begins working with the engine, making their own modifications that will most likely take the efficiency to even higher levels.

“This marks another great moment for the engine and our world-class team working on its development,” said Sal Scuderi, president of the Scuderi Group. “It’s great to be able to share this milestone with those who have been following our development and who have showed overwhelming interest since we first introduced this concept and design over three years ago. Now that we have reached this point, we strongly encourage automakers to take advantage of the opportunity that the Scuderi Engine presents to produce more fuel-efficient engines.”

The Scuderi Engine is a split-cycle design that divides the four strokes of a conventional combustion cycle over two paired cylinders: one intake/compression cylinder and one power/exhaust cylinder. By firing after top-dead center, it produces highly efficient, cleaner combustion with one cylinder and compressed air in the other. Unlike conventional engines that require two crankshaft revolutions to complete a single combustion cycle, the Scuderi Engine requires just one. Besides the improvements in efficiency and emissions, studies show that the Scuderi Engine is capable of producing more torque than conventional gasoline and diesel engines.

With the naturally aspirated engine up and running, the Scuderi Group and its independent laboratory continue to work on the next prototypes. Completion of the turbocharged Scuderi Engine and the Scuderi Air-Hybrid are expected in 2010.

About The Scuderi Group

Based in West Springfield, Mass., USA, with offices in Frankfurt, Germany, the Scuderi Group is a research and development company focused on proliferating its technology through R&D and licensing. Its revolutionary Scuderi Engine technology, when fully developed, is expected to be the most significant improvement in engine efficiency in over 130 years. The Scuderi Group’s global patent portfolio contains more than 200 patents including 72 issued in more than 50 countries. For more information call 1-413-439-0343 or visit www.ScuderiEngine.com.

 
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Posted by on July 1, 2009 in Mechatronic Applications

 

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A Lean revenge against mass production from ”The Economist” point of view. Part III

“… Only in the 1970s, after the first oil shock, did faults start to become visible. The finned and chromed V8-powered monsters beloved of Americans were replaced by dumpy, front-wheel-drive boxes designed to meet new rules (known as CAFE standards) limiting the average fuel economy of carmakers fleets and to compete with Japanese imports. As well as being dull to look at, the new cars were less reliable than equivalent Japanese models.

By the early 1980s it had begun to dawn on GM that the Japanese could not only make better cars but also do so far more efficiently. A joint venture with Toyota to manufacture cars in California was an eye-opener. It convinced GM’s management that “lean” manufacturing was of the highest importance. Unfortunately, that meant still less attention being paid to the quality of the cars GM was turning out. Most were indistinguishable, badge-engineered non-entities. As the appeal of its products sank, so did the prices GM could ask. New ways had to be found to cut costs further, making the cars still less attractive to buyers….”

Briefing. The bankruptcy of General Motors. A giant falls. The Economist. June 6th-12th 2009. Pp 58-60. Ed. The Economist Newspaper Ltd.

 
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Posted by on June 8, 2009 in Lean Manufacturing

 

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A Lean revenge against mass production from ”The Economist” point of view. Part I

“…GM, Ford and Chrysler tried to improve: by 2006 they had almost caught up with Japanese standards of efficiency and even quality. But by then, GM’s share of American market had fallen go below a quarter. Rounds of closures and job cuts were difficult to negotiate with unions, and were always too little too late. Gradually the cars got better, but Americans had moved on. The younger generation of carbuyers stayed faithful to their Toyotas, Hondas or Mercedes assembled in the new cheaper factories below the Mason-Dixon line. GM and the other American firms were left with the older buyers who were, literally, dying out.

GM’s demise should not be read as a harbinger of doom for the car industry. All around the world people want wheels: a car tends to be the first big purchase a family makes once its income rises much above $5000 a year, in purchasing-power terms. At the same time as people in developing countries are getting richer, more efficient factories and better designs are making cars more affordable. That is why the IMF forecasts that the world will have nearly 3 billion cars in 2050…

… Yet although the long-term prospects for ales growth look excellent overall, the car industry has a problem: it needs to shrink dramatically. At present, there’s enough capacity globally to make 90m vehicles a year, but demand is little more than 60m in good economic times. Even as the big global manufacturers have been building new factories in emerging markets, governments in slow-growing rich-world markets have been bribing them to keep capacity open there.

Because the industry employs so many people and is a repository of high technology, governments are easily lured into the belief that car firms must be supported when times are tough. Hence Mr Obama’s $50 billion rescue of GM; and hence, too, the German government’s financial backing for the sale of Opel, GM’s European arm, to Magna, a Canadian parts maker backed by a Russian state-owned bank. German politicians have made it clear that they plan to keep German factories open even if others elsewhere in Europe have to close. At least the American rescue recognizes the need to remove capacity from the market: GM will, as a result of the deal, lose 14 factories, 29.000 workers and 2.400 dealers

It could still be a great business

For all its peculiarities, the car industry is no dinosaur-Toyota, for instance is a byword for manufacturing excellence. But the unevolved GM deserves extinction. Detroit employed so many people and figured so large in American culture that governments felt they had to protect it; but in doing so, they made it vulnerable to less-coddled competitors from abroad. By trying to keep their car industry big, America’s leaders ended up preventing it from becoming good. There is a lesson in that which all governments would do well to learn”

The decline and fall of General Motors. Detroitosaurus wrecks. The Economist. June 6th-12th 2009. Pp 10. Ed. The Economist Newspaper Ltd.

 
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Posted by on June 8, 2009 in Lean Manufacturing

 

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